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ii. 
I. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the Idaho Industrial Commission in a worker's compensation case. 
Claimant/Respondent Stephen Neel (hereinafter "Neel") alleged that he had been injured 
in an industrial accident during the course of his employment for Western Construction, Inc. 
After investigation, the Employer and its workers' compensation surety, Advantage Workers 
Compensation Insurance Company (hereinafter collectively "Employer/Surety") denied Mr. 
Neel's workers' compensation claim. The compensability of the claim was litigated, and 
following a hearing the Industrial Commission found in favor of Mr. Neel as to the 
compensability of the claim. Subsequently, medical bills relating to Mr. Neel's treatment were 
submitted to the Employer/Surety for payment. Following their typical procedures, these bills 
were submitted to a third party for medical cost containment review. (i.e. a determination as to 
the reasonableness of the charges). Following that review, Employer/Surety tendered payment 
of the reasonable amount of the bills. Neel did not object to the reasonableness of the 
Employer/Surety's bill reductions, but contended that Industrial Commission decisions required 
Employer/Surety to pay the "full invoiced amount" of the medical bills. Employer/Surety 
responded by noting that there was no question raised as to the reasonableness of the bill 
reductions, but that Neel was advancing a strictly legal argument that the Employer/Surety were 
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obligated to pay full invoiced amounts without regard to reasonableness, and, therefore, it 
appeared appropriate to submit the issue on a motion. 
The Industrial Commission accepted Neel's argument and ruled in Neel's favor, finding 
that Employer/Surety were obligated to pay the full invoiced amount of the bills and held that 
there could be no review for reasonableness where the claim had initially been denied. The 
Industrial Commission additionally awarded attorney fees in favor of Neel based upon the notion 
that the Employer/Surety acted unreasonably in submitted the bills through their cost 
containment program. Employer/Surety appeal from the Industrial Commission's decision on 
the motion as to the amount of the medical billings and the attorney fee award. 
II. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mr. Neel provided notice and made claim for a September 14, 2005 industrial accident 
and injury by means of filing a Form 1 on October 13, 2005. (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Recommendation, R., p. 21). At the time Neel provided notice and made claim, he had 
already incurred medical expenses which had been submitted to his health carrier. (Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation, R., p. 11). On September 24, 2005, he had 
been seen at Holy Rosary, where x-rays were undertaken. This was billed to his health carrier. 
(Hearing Ex. No. 10, p. 00129). 
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The worker's compensation claim was denied, Neel initiated litigation with the filing of a 
Complaint, and Employer/Surety responded with an Answer denying the compensability of the 
claim. 
A hearing was held on September 26, 2006, as laid out in the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation. (R., p. 7). Neel's counsel did not have the medical 
bills available prior to or at the hearing. No medical bills were submitted for the Industrial 
Commission's or Employer/Surety's review at the time of hearing. (Hearing Ex. 1-12; Tr., p. 5, 
L. 20 - p. 6, L. 10). The hearing transcript is devoid of any discussion as to how the medical 
bills were handled. Employer/Surety's counsel can only represent to the Court that the focus of 
the hearing was on the issue of causation and that it was agreed Neel's counsel could submit the 
medical bills to the Employer/Surety's counsel at a later date should he prevail. To the extent 
that the Industrial Commission decision purports to deal with the compensability of medical bills 
as opposed to medical treatment under Idaho Code § 72-432, there never was any record of such 
available for their review prior to the entry of Order on June 8, 2007. 
Ultimately, Neel prevailed, and the claim was deemed to be compensable by means of the 
Industrial Commission's June 8, 2007, Order. (R., p. 28). Neel's counsel subsequently provided 
to Employer/Surety all the medical bills, although all the bills were not received until July 6, 
2007. Employer/Surety's counsel made a preliminary objection to the bills by means of a July 
31, 2007 letter sent to Neel's counsel. The Surety then submitted the medical bills to a third 
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party provider for review as to the reasonableness of the bills incurred, as they would for any 
other compensable workers' compensation claim, and upon receipt of the results of the audit, 
tendered $92,072.71 payment on medical bills totaling $100,712.71. Neel's counsel filed a 
motion requesting that the Industrial Commission enter an order compelling payment of the "full 
invoiced amount" of the medical benefits awarded to Respondent in the June 7, 2007 Order. (R., 
p. 30). Neel's counsel filed a memorandum in support of his motion and Exhibits 1-4, which 
included his transmittal letter, a summary of medical expenses presumably prepared by Neel's 
counsel, actual medical bills reflecting not only amounts billed, but amounts receipted from the 
health insurer - Blue Shield in this instance - and the results of the audit conducted by the third 
party entity Advantage Workers Compensation Insurance Company utilized to conduct the audit 
of the medical bills. (R., pp. 32-167). Finally, Neel's counsel submitted the fee agreement he 
had entered into with his client. (R., p. 169). 
Employer/Surety filed a responsive memorandum in opposition to the motion pointing 
out that no one had taken umbrage with the reasonableness of the deductions reduced by the 
audit, nor had anyone requested an evidentiary hearing in order to determine the reasonableness 
of bills, but, rather, the motion as filed by Neel's counsel appeared to present a straightforward 
legal issue as to whether or not Neel was entitled to receive payment in the full invoiced amount 
as reflected on the original medical bills, or whether those medical bills were subject to scrutiny 
as to whether they were reasonable in amount (R., pp. 170-176). The Industrial Commission, by 
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means of an order dated December 11, 2007, concluded that Employer/Surety were not entitled 
to review the bills as to reasonableness, but rather were required to pay the full invoiced amount 
of the bills, and further that Employer/Surety Surety were unreasonable in contending that they 
be provided an opportunity to review the reasonableness of the bills. (R., pp. 177-180). 
III. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether a surety, having denied a claim subsequently determined compensable by the 
Industrial Commission following hearing, is precluded from reviewing bills for otherwise 
compensable medical treatment in order to detennine whether such medical bills are reasonable. 
2. Whether a surety, having denied a claim subsequently detennined to be compensable by 
the Industrial Commission following hearing, can employ the Industrial Commission's 
regulations regarding allowable charges by medical providers and facilities in determining 
whether medical bills are reasonable. 
3. Whether Employer/Surety in the present instance acted unreasonably, justifying an award 
of attorney's fees under Idaho Code §72-804 by reviewing medical bills incurred utilizing a cost 
containment program in turn based upon Industrial Commission regulations regarding, where 
applicable, "usual and customary charges," and where otherwise applicable, Industrial 
Commission fee schedules. 
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A. 
IV. 
ARGUMENT 
Idaho's Workers' Compensation Law Envisions the Surety Will Pay Reasonable 
Amounts for Medical Services. 
Claims for medical expenses must satisfy the statutory requirement of Idaho Code §72-
432. The statute requires that the employer provide reasonable medical treatment. This Court 
has advised that Idaho Code §72-432(1) stands for the proposition that the Industrial 
Commission has the authority to review and determine whether the charges made by the medical 
provider were fair and reasonable. Sprague v. Caldwell Transp. Inc., 116 Idaho 720, 779 P.2d 
395 (1989). The same subsection envisions that the employer may fail to provide "reasonable 
medical" as envisioned by the statute, and in such instances the employee may obtain such care 
at the expense of the employer. The point is, the statute envisions that medical can be incurred in 
worker's compensation cases in situations other than where the employer provides the care. This 
particular portion of the statute reads, "If the employer fails to provide the same, the injured 
employee may do so at the expense of the employer." Idaho Code § 72-432(1 ). "The same" 
means "reasonable medical," as referenced above in the statute. Thus, the last sentence of that 
particular portion of the statute contemplates that if the employer fails to provide reasonable 
medical care, the injured employee may do so, i.e. may obtain "reasonable medical" at the 
expense of the employer. 
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Nowhere does Idaho Code §72-432 suggest that the employee can obtain medical care 
that is unreasonable as to the amount charged. In fact, to the contrary, the current Idaho Code 
§72-432 makes it clear that there will not be any balance billing in worker's compensation 
claims. LC. §72-432(6). Balance billing in turn is defined under Idaho Code §72-102(2) as: 
... charging, billing, or otherwise attempting to collect directly from an 
injured employee payment for medical services in excess of amounts 
allowable in compensation claims as provided by the rules promulgated by 
the Commission pursuant to Idaho Code §72-508. 
Idaho Code § 72-43 2( 6) and § 72-102(2) were added by the legislature in 2006 in order to 
clarify and emphasize that billing to injured workers amounts in excess of the pertinent 
regulations is not allowed. (See, House Commerce and Human Resources Committee Minutes 
for February 13, 2006 as they pertain to House Bill 649; see Appendix 3). 
Idaho Code §72-432 is not limited to those claims where the employer steps up from day 
one and provides and pays for medical care. Idaho Code § 72-432 covers all claims for medical 
expenses under the statute and provides, without limitation, that in such claims no provider shall 
engage in balance billing, i.e. billing an amount in excess of what the Industrial Commission has 
determined to be reasonable. 
The current Idaho Code § 72-432 cites to Idaho Code§ 72-508 for further clarification on 
the prohibition against balance billing. Idaho Code § 72-508 is merely the statute that provides 
the Industrial Commission with the authority to promulgate reasonable rules and regulations. 
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The statute must be read in conjunction with Idaho Code § 72-803. Prior to 2005 this statute 
read: 
Claims for attorneys and claims for medical services and for medicine and 
related benefits shall be subject to approval by the Industrial Commission. 
This statute was amended by the legislature in 2005. The legislature had become 
impatient with the Industrial Commission's failure to revamp the regulatory scheme as to 
medical expenses and in 2005 enacted a statute requiring the Industrial Commission to 
implement a regulatory fee schedule for medical services no later than April 1, 2006. The fact of 
the matter is that the Industrial Commission enacted regulatory fee schedules for most of the 
services provided by medical providers as of April 1, 2006, and by April 1, 2007, these 
regulations were expanded to include hospitals. IDAPA 17.02.08.031 and 032. (See, Appendix 
2). 
Prior to 2005, the Industrial Commission regulated medical bills by defining reasonable 
as those which are "usual and customary". Former ID APA 17.02.08.031.01 (See, Appendix 2). 
Specifically, the Industrial Commission defined usual as "the most frequent charge made for a 
given service to a non-industrial patient." Former IDAPA 17.02.08.031.02(e). It defined 
customary as "no higher than the 90th percentile of usual charges made by Idaho providers for a 
given service." Former IDAPA 17.02.08.031.02(f). The bulk of Neel's medical bills in this case 
were incurred while medical expenses in worker's compensation claims were governed by what 
was "usual and customary" under the regulation, a few were incurred subsequent to the adoption 
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the fee schedule. All the statutes and regulations adopted with respect to payment of medical 
expenses envision the Defendants will pay amounts that are reasonable. No statute or regulation 
exists which suggests that an employer or surety should pay full invoiced amount or amounts 
that are otherwise unreasonable. 
Idaho Code § 72-432 applies to all workers' compensation claims (regardless of whether 
the claims were initially accepted or denied by the surety). It requires that medical bills be 
reasonable. It prohibits billing in excess of the Industrial Commission regulatory definition of 
what is a reasonable charge for medical treatment. 
B. The Industrial Commission's Reliance on the St. Alphonsus Regional Medical 
Center v. Edmondson Decision is Misplaced. 
The Industrial Commission is empowered and in fact directed by statute to ensure that 
medical expenses paid under the workers' compensation system remain reasonable in amount. 
How then do we come to this situation where the Industrial Commission has issued an order 
which actually precludes a surety from reviewing medical billings for reasonableness? The 
problem begins with this Court's decision in St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center v. 
Edmondson, 130 Idaho 108, 937 P.2d 420 (1997). The Industrial Commission cites the 
Edmondson case and apparently relies upon it for the proposition that an employer/surety, having 
once denied a claim cannot, after the claim has been found compensable, subject medical billings 
to a review for reasonableness and must instead pay the "full invoiced amount" of the billings. 
However, Edmondson does not command this result. The particular portion of the Edmondson 
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decision upon which the Industrial Commission appears to rely is dicta in a case which did not 
deal with the issue presently before this Court. 
At issue in Edmondson was whether or not Claimant's counsel, who had won a hard 
fought case at hearing, was entitled to claim a fee out of that portion of the award that 
represented the cost of unreimbursed medical care. Unlike Neel in the present instance, Mr. 
Edmondson was uninsured and came to St. Alphonsus for emergency care, which the hospital 
was obligated to provide. St. Alphonsus refused to accept the amount awarded by the Industrial 
Commission, less 30% for an attorney's fee. Their contention was that they could make demand 
for payment directly by the surety to the healthcare provider. The Industrial Commission 
rejected their arguments holding that the workers' compensation laws do not require direct 
payment to the provider and that claimant was entitled to an attorney's fee from part of the 
proceeds. The Court, on appeal, affirmed that the Industrial Commission was empowered to 
approve claims of attorneys for fees and that there was nothing in the Act that required an 
employer and surety to make payment directly to a provider as opposed to claimant. 
The St. Alphonsus v. Edmondson case does not deal with the issue at hand. In 
Edmondson, the Court was concerned with what were lhe hospital's arguments that they had a 
right to demand payment directly. The Court, in reviewing this limited issue, wrote: 
The provider contends that the commission's administrative regulations 
concerning medical expenses support its right to direct payment by lhe 
employer and the surety. These regulations, IDAPA 17.02.08.031 and 
.032, refer, however, to the circumstance where 'the payor acknowledges 
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liability for the claim.' IDAPA 17.02.00.032.04. By their own terms, 
these regulations do not apply to circumstances where the employer and 
the surety denied liability for the claim, as in the present case. 
St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center v. Edmondson, 130 Idabo 108, 937 P.2d 420 (1997). 
The regulations in question encompass more than the Court acknowledged in the Edmondson 
case. The Court quotes only one portion of the regulation, that being former IDAP A 
17.02.08.032.04 (See, Appendix 1). That portion of the regulation defines how the medical 
provider and the payor are going to handle their affairs preliminary to a dispute resolution 
process in the situation where the payor from the outset acknowledges liability for the claim. 
That portion of the regulation only handles the situation where the payor gets the bill from the 
provider and has no issue or dispute with the bill. It establishes that in such instance the payor 
shall pay the undisputed charges within 30 calendar days. However, the regulation goes on to 
establish what happens when the payor acknowledges liability for the claim, but nonetheless has 
reservations about the amount of the bill or needs clarification of the bill. Former IDAP A 
17.02.08.032.05 (See, Appendix 1). The regulation goes on to provide how matters will be 
handled when at the time a provider submits a medical bill the payor is still investigating the 
compensability of the claim. Fonner IDAPA 17.02.08.032.10. Under §§ (a) of the former 
ID APA 17.02.08.032.10, the regulation provides that where the result of the investigation was a 
denial of liability, the payor has an obligation to provide a single objection to each medical 
provider from whom they have received a bill. Under §§ (b) of that same portion of the 
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regulation, it further clarifies that where the Industrial Commission has made a determination of 
claims compensability, the 30 day period in which the payor must pay the bill or object to the bill 
shall "recommence running on the date of entry of a final Commission order determining that the 
claim was compensable." Former IDAPA 17.02.08.032.10.b (See, Appendix 1). The regulations 
in effect at the time denial was made in this case are silent where denial is made but the 
providers fail to send bills to the employer or the surety. All this means is that when the 
Industrial Commission originally enacted the regulation in question, they did not envision the 
current scenario. 
The point is, Industrial Commission regulations at the time this claim was denied 
envisioned and applied to situations other than those where the payor acknowledges liability for 
the claim, contrary to the assertions of the Court in Edmondson, and contrary to the Industrial 
Commission's assertions in the present instance. The regulation in effect at the time this claim 
was denied specifically envisioned and included situations where a claim was denied and a 
hearing on the compensability was held by the Industrial Commission; they just did not envision 
the current situation where a claimant's counsel advances the claim for medical expenses, not the 
provider. Furthermore, the factual situation in the present case is dramatically different than the 
factual question which the Court confronted in the Edmondson case, at which time the Court was 
really trying to ascertain whether or not the medical provider had standing to demand direct 
payment. The Edmondson case does not apply to the current instance. 
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C. Preclusion of Medical Bill Review is Unfair. 
The Industrial Commission is preoccupied by what it deems to be a windfall employers 
and sureties would enjoy should medical bills in the present instance be subject to review. To 
this point, the Industrial Commission wrote: 
R., p. 178. 
... when .Defendants refuse to reimburse medical providers for the 
difference between billing rates arid contractrates[ or, as is this case, usual 
and customary] the providers suffer a loss for which they did not bargain, 
and surety enjoys a windfall that it did not earn. Sangster, 2004 IIC 0681. 
In the present case, Defendants speculate as to who will receive the 
"excess" monies if Claimant's counsel negotiates reductions with the 
providers. Whether negotiations occur with the providers is of no concern 
to the Defendants. Claimant is in a contractual relationship with his 
medical providers - Defendants are not. 
The Industrial Commission goes on to claim, "Claimant is now being billed for the 
medical treatment by his medical providers ... ". (R., p. 179). Employer/Surety take issue with 
the Industrial Commission's statement for several reasons. First, there is absolutely nothing in 
the evidentiary record which supports the notion that Neel is being billed for anything at the 
present time or continues to owe anybody any money for the medical treatment he received. At 
hearing, Neel did not put his bills into evidence. He offered no testimony as to what was paid, 
what remained unpaid, what demands were being made upon him or who was making those 
demands. Bills that Neel's counsel submitted as part of his motion document that the bulk of his 
medical treatment was processed under his health policy, and presumably there was some co-
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payment that he was required to make subject to stop-loss provisions in his health policy, and 
there may have been non-covered services he received for which he is responsible absent 
coverage under worker's compensation, and Neel's counsel has suggested such informally to 
Employer/Surety. However, the vast majority of the bills generated by Neel's need for medical 
treatment were subject to contractual provisions his health carrier had with his medical providers, 
which provisions undoubtedly called for payment at markedly lower rates than those that would 
be allowed under the Workers' Compensation Act. The healthcare providers, having agreed to 
such terms with Neel's health carrier, are frankly bound by them unless this Court holds that 
those medical bills come under the Workers' Compensation Act, this claim having subsequently 
been litigated before the Industrial Commission favorably to Neel. To the extent that the 
Industrial Commission believes that Neel is obligated to pay the full invoiced amounts reflected 
in his medical bills, the Industrial Commission is mistaken. Neel's health policy, like pretty 
much everybody's health policy, determines what he and his health carrier had to pay and what 
the healthcare providers were willing to accept, not some mythical contract negotiations he 
entered into with his providers, as is envisioned by the Industrial Commission in this matter. 
Secondly, the healthcare providers in this instance were not deprived of any bargain they 
had made. The vast majority of Neel's medical bills were subject to agreements these healthcare 
providers made with his health carrier at rates much lower than what employers and sureties pay 
in a worker's compensation claim. Obviously, the providers were satisfied with the agreements 
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they struck with the health carrier or they would not have entered into them and they would not 
have provided the services they provided to Neel, all of which were elective. It is not the Surety 
that seeks a windfall under the current facts. The Surety seeks to pay what a surety is supposed 
to pay - that which is reasonable under the Workers' Compensation Act. To the contrary, the 
windfall would be in favor of the health providers or whoever would get the difference between 
invoiced amounts and the amounts allowable under the health policy. The health providers did 
not bargain for such, did not expect to receive such, and no contract has been produced or put 
into evidence suggesting they have the right to subsequently seek such. To the contrary, it is the 
Workers' Compensation Act that says what they should be paid, not some contract. 
The Industrial Commission expresses concerns based upon Neel's contracting directly 
with healthcare providers as establishing obligations outside the Workers' Compensation Act. It 
is more than debatable whether Neel in this instance really contracted with such healthcare 
providers where his health policy already governed his dealings with those healthcare providers. 
The fact of the matter is, had this man been uninsured, the surgery would not have been done, 
because he would have had no means to pay, and neither the hospital nor the surgeon would have 
undertaken the surgery under those circumstances, the procedure being elective in nature. The 
services were provided because there was coverage under his health policy on tenns the 
healthcare providers were willing to abide by. We do not know what sort of paperwork Neel 
actually executed with his healthcare providers, and it really is not important in any event to the 
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extent that any agreement he entered into with the healthcare providers was initially subject to 
agreements they already had with his health carrier, and after this claim was deemed 
compensable, was subject to what is deemed reasonable under Idaho Code § 72-432. 
Claimants often incur medical expense before even filing a worker's compensation claim, 
which means they necessarily incur some responsibility for medical expenses ostensibly outside 
of the Workers' Compensation Act per the Industrial Commission's reasoning. A worker may 
be so injured at the time of an accident that he is unable to tell his medical providers the 
circumstances under which medical care was made necessary. He may be unconscious. He may 
not have the ability to speak. He may be unaware that the circumstances leading to his need for 
medical care were otherwise compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act. For example, 
in the current case, Neel claims injury on September 14, 2005. (Tr., p. 8, L. 3). He first sought 
care from Dominican Health on September 23, 2005. (Tr., p. 51, LL. 9-19). He gave them his 
union care and had them process his treatment under his health policy. (Tr., p. 53, LL. 1-6). He 
went to Holy Rosary Hospital the next day. (Tr., p. 53, L. 19). He did not tell the hospital staff 
that he had injured himself at work and had them process his claim under his health policy. (Tr., 
p. 55, LL. 4-24). Neel next went to Dr. Owens, a chiropractor, on September 26, 2005 and had 
them treat him under his health policy. (Tr., p. 56, LL. 2-19). He continued to treat with Dr. 
Owens over the next several days, but did not make a worker's compensation claim until October 
13, 2005, when he did so at Dr. Owens' office with the help of Dr. Owens' staff. (Tr.; p. 58, LL. 
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8-10). By the time Neel filed his worker's compensation claim on October 13, 2005, he had 
already undergone an MRI, he had already seen a neurosurgeon, and he already had a tentative 
surgery date. (Tr., p. 64, LL. 1-1 I). 
Obviously, the Surety in this case took issue with whether or not Neel's problems were 
due to an accident and injury said to have occuned a month prior to making a claim, and only 
after he had wracked up considerable medical treatment, and only at a time when he was aware 
that his future medical treatment was going to be expensive and his convalescence long. 
Employer/Surety denied his claim and took its case to the Industrial Commission, where they 
Jost. Having lost, Employer/Surety is not arguing that all Neel's medical treatment was 
contracted for outside the Workers' Compensation Act and, therefore, does not come under the 
Act Employer/Surety is not contending at this time that it does not owe for this care. 
Employer/Surety lost, and Neel's claim was deemed compensable. All Employer/Surety wanted 
to do following receipt ofthe Industrial Commission decision was pay that which is considered 
"reasonable medical" under Idaho Code § 72-432, and that is what Employer/Surety did. 
The healthcare providers in this case are not going to "suffer a loss for which they did not 
bargain." (Order Regarding Payment of Medical Benefits, R., p. l 78). To the contrary, the 
bargain that they made was at the lower rates paid by the health carrier. They were willing to 
provide the services to Neel at these lower rates. No one would contend that the workers' 
compensation rates are lower than what Blue Shield contracts to pay. Indeed, that is the whole 
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premise behind the Industrial Commission decision in the current matter - that health carriers 
pay less and that would somehow be unfair to hold them to those amounts. 
Likewise, Employer/Surety do not contend that they should be able to take advantage of 
the contractual discounts negotiated by the health carrier. It is bad public policy to allow sureties 
in workers' compensation cases to take advantage of the discount rates negotiated by Blue 
Cross/Blue Shield. Allowing such would, in tum, create an incentive for sureties to deny claims 
on a flimsy basis where health coverage otherwise was available in order to get the health carrier 
to pick up the coverage. The surety in such an instance could then step in, accept responsibility 
for the claim after payment by the Blues, and take advantage of these discount rates. 
Employer/Surety in the present instance do not believe that that is a desirable result in the 
workers' compensation system, but, likewise, Employer/Surety do not believe that it is a 
desirable result to have some sort of two-tiered medical reimbursement policy under the Act 
depending upon whether a claim is accepted at the outset or whether it is accepted after the 
Industrial Commission deems a claim compensable. Just like sureties should not have a financial 
incentive that works to artificially encourage. them to deny a claim, they should not have 
financial disincentive to otherwise accept a claim that they believe should be denied simply 
because they will be penalized by a requirement that they pay the full invoiced amounts if their 
denial is subsequently deemed to be incorrect. All workers' compensation claims as to medical 
expenses ought to be subject to the same scrutiny for medical bills. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 18 
Employer/Surety respectfully disagree with the Industrial Commission representation and 
its decision on Claimant's motion that what happens to the monies paid out is of "no concern to 
Defendants." (R. p. I 78). Of course Employer/Surety are not only concerned about what they 
pay for medical treatment, but where the money goes. If the money does not go to the medical 
provider, why should Employer/Surety pay it? The Industrial Commission's decision is 
premised on a hypothetical, and Employer/Surety believe mistaken, notion that Neel is somehow 
obligated to pay full invoiced amounts, and, therefore, that is why they ordered the payment of 
full invoiced amounts. Employer/Surety do not believe that anybody in the State of Idaho pays 
full invoiced amounts other than perhaps individuals who are uninsured. Even in that instance, 
they do not pay the full invoiced amounts, frankly, oftentimes they declare bankruptcy or 
negotiate discounts directly with the healthcare providers. The fact of the matter is, blue collar 
workers who are otherwise uninsured, to the extent that they can even get healthcare providers to 
provide elective services such as these, surely cannot repay them. Who would seriously argue 
that a blue collar worker grossing $30,000.00 a year could in any meaningful fashion repay a 
medical debt of $100,000.00 in any sort of time frame that would be meaningful to anybody? 
These folks simply do not have that kind of discretionary income. Who would seriously contend 
that a healthcare provider would prefer to take their chances in collecting full invoiced amounts 
from a worker over the certain recovery of reasonable amounts from a surety? The fact of the 
matter is, under the Industrial Commission's position, there are no guarantees as to where the 
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money would go. To the extent that it may go into the pockets of Neel and Neel's counsel 
himself and that the medical providers may not receive any of it, which they may well not, that 
certainly seems problematic to Employer/Surety and does not appear to be of any importance to 
the Industrial Commission. Employer/Surety not only reiterate that this is of concern to them, 
Employer/Surety believe it should be of concern to everyone in the State of Idaho. We should all 
be concerned about what is charged for medical treatment in Idaho under various pay schemes, 
including the workers' compensation system. Employer/Surety frankly find the Industrial 
Commission's position in this regard disturbing. 
D. Employer/Surety Did Not Act Unreasonably in Contesting Neel's Demand that the 
Full Invoiced Amount of the B.ills be Paid. 
Neither Neel's counsel nor the Industrial Commission in their order cite any statutory or 
Idaho Supreme Conrt authority for the proposition that, having denied a claim, a surety is 
prohibited from subsequently reviewing the reasonableness of medical bills submitted to it for 
payment. While Employer/Surety are aware that there are several Industrial Commission 
opinions authored since 2004 for this proposition, none of those cases went up on appeal, at least 
as to this issue. As to the Idaho Supreme Court, the larger issue presented by this claim is an 
issue of first impression. Employer/Surety are not privy to why Idaho employers and sureties did 
not challenge the position of the Industrial Commission in prior Industrial Commission 
decisions. The mere fact that others did not see fit to bring this issue before the Court does not 
mean that somehow Employer/Surety in the current instance should be penalized for contesting 
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what appears to be a position taken by the Industrial Commission premised upon no statute or 
case law emanating from this Court. As such, regardless of what the Court ultimately determines 
on the substantive issue as to whether or not Employer/Surety should be allowed to review the 
medical bills as to the reasonableness of amount, it seems unfair that Employer/Surety should be 
precluded from challenging the Industrial Commission's position, particularly where there is no 
authority with precedential value precluding such a challenge. 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
Employer/Surety are not arguing that they should be entitled to take advantage of 
advantageous rates negotiated by health carriers. Employer/Surety are suggesting that in those 
cases where a claim has been denied and subsequently been found compensable by order of the 
Industrial Commission, the defendant surety and employer should have the opportunity to 
receive and review the medical bills incurred in order to determine whether or not these bills are 
unreasonable either because the amounts are excessive, the bills reflect double billing or clerical 
errors, or because the bills reflect services rendered for something other than the worker's 
compensation claim. 
In the present instance, the Industrial Commission's original order only pertained to 
whether Neel was entitled to medical treatment received as a result of the alleged industrial 
accident and injury. (Tr., p. 5, LL. 15-17). The accuracy and reasonableness of the medical bills 
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could not have been ascertained and was not ascertained as part of that hearing process for the 
simple reason that those medical bills were never submitted as a part of that hearing process. 
Neel's counsel did not have them ready and available at the- time of hearing. To the extent that 
the Industrial Commission's decision could be read otherwise, it is overreaching since it is 
premised upon nothing. There were no medical bills in the record, nor are there to this day any 
medical bills in the record as part of an evidentiary review. 
Employer/Surety has no problem with an Industrial Commission review of Neel's motion 
as long as everybody understands this review was as to strictly a legal issue rather than a factual 
issue. That is to say, no one has challenged, or to date i.s challenging, whether or not 
Employer/Surety' reduction of the medical bills was anything other than reasonable. The 
concerns expressed by Neel's counsel in his motion was whether or not Employer/Surety should 
have any right to reduce medical bills or should be required to pay full invoiced amounts. 
Likewise, the Industrial Commission's order on Neel's motion only deals with and only could 
deal with the legal issue presented. It is an either/or proposition. 
Neither Neel nor the Industrial Commission, have pointed to any statute or any case 
issuing from this Court suggesting anything other than medical bills incurred in worker's 
compensation cases should be reasonable. Neither Neel nor the Industrial Commission can cite 
to any statute or any case issuing from this Court denying the right of a surety and employer to 
review medical bills as whether they are reasonable. To the contrary, the statutory scheme 
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envisions that employers and sureties will pay reasonable medical bills and that when they fail to 
do so employees can do so and that medical providers will not be allowed to charge more than 
what is deemed to be reasonable by the Industrial Commission through its rules and regulation 
making process. The statutes on their face do not limit their application to those instances where 
the claim is immediately accepted. The statutes don't address and make exception as to what 
you do if medical bills are incurred before anyone knows that there is a worker's compensation 
claim. Likewise, the statutes don't say anything about what to do when a claim has been denied 
and subsequently deemed to be compensable. Employer/Surety believe that is because it is not 
so important when the claim is deemed to be compensable or under what circumstances so much 
as it is important for everyone to understand that medical benefits in a claim, having been 
deemed to be compensable, become subject to a review as to what is reasonable under the 
statutes and the pertinent regulations. 
It is difficult to understand why the Industrial Commission would want to limit a review 
of medical expenses which is designed to assure that medical providers charge reasonable 
amounts for their services. If a chiropractor were to charge ten thousand dollars for one 
chiropractic treatment, wouldn't one want a system set up to call into question the propriety of 
such a bill? Under such a scenario, why should it make any difference whether the claim was 
denied at some point in time? The statutory scheme expressed no interest in the circumstances 
under which a claimant receives medical treatment other than to make clear that the provisions of 
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the Act apply to those situations where an employer provides the care, where the claimant goes 
out and gets the care at the expense of the employer, or where the care is rendered in emergency 
circumstances where a claimant may not be able to participate in. the selection of care. That is as 
it should be. Medical expenses should be the same in all workers' compensation claims. They 
should be fair and reasonable to all parties concerned. That is what Employer/Surety are asking 
for in this instance. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / 0 day of May, 2008: 
BOWEN & BAILEY, LLP 
• 
R. fthe Firm 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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IDAPA 17 
TITLE 02 
Chapter 08 
17.02.08 - MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
000. LEGAL AUTHORITY. 
These rules are adopted and promulgated by the Industrial. Commission pursuant to the provision of Section 72-508, 
Idaho Code. (7-6-94) 
001. TITLE AND SCOPE. 
These rules shall be cited as IDAPA 17.02.08, "Miscellaneous Provisions". 
002. WRITTEN INTERPRETATIONS. 
No written interpretations of these rules exist. 
003. ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS. 
(7-6-94) 
(7-6-94) 
There is no administrative appeal from decisions of the Industrial Commission in workers' compensation matters, as 
the Commission is exempted from contested-cases provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act. (7-6-94) 
004. -· 030. (RESERVED). 
031. ACCEPTABLE CHARGES FOR MEDICAL SERVICES UNDER THE IDAHO WORKERS' 
COMPENSATION LAW. 
Pursuant to Section 72-508 and Section 72-803, Idaho Code, the Induslrial Commission (hereinafter "the 
Commission") hereby substitutes the following for the January 28, 1975 amendment to the "Rules and Regulations . 
Governing Charges for Medical Services Provided under the Idaho Workers' Compensation Law," dated May 2, 
1973: (6-1-92) 
01. Acceptable Charges Under The Idaho Workers' Compensation Law. Payors shall pay a 
Provider's reasonable charge for Medical Services furnished to induslrially injured patients. (6-1-92) 
02. Definitions. Words and terms used in this rule are defined in the subsections which fo!low.(6-1-92) 
a. "Provider" means any person, firm, corporation, partnership, association, agency,. institution or 
other legal entity providing any kind of Medical Services related to the treatment of an industrially injured patient 
which are compensable under Idaho's Workers' Compensation Law. · (6-1-92) 
b. "Payor" means the legal entity responsible for paying medical benefits under Idaho's Workers' 
Compensation Law. (6-1-92) 
c. "Medical Services" means medical, surgical, dental or other attendance or treatment, nurse and 
hospital service, medicines, apparatus, appliances, prostheses, and related services, facilities, equipment and supplies. 
(7-1-95) 
d. "Reasonable," except as provided in Subsections 031.02.g. and 031.02.h., means a charge does not 
exceed the Provider's "usual" charge and does not exceed the "customary" charge, as defined below. (7-1-95) 
e. "Usual" means the most frequent charge made by an individual Provider for a given service to non-
industrially injured patients. (7-1-95) 
f. "Customary" means a charge which shall have an upper limit no higher than the 90th percentile, as 
determined by the Commission, of usual charges made by Idaho Providers for a given service. (7-1-95) 
g. Provided, however, that for medical services which are not represented by CPT codes, 
reasonableness of charges shall be determined based on all relevant evidence available, including indus1ry standards, 
invoices and catalog prices. (7-1-95) 
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h. Provided, further, that where a Medical Service is one that is exceptional, unusual, variable, rarely 
provided, or so new that a determination cannot be made as to whether the charge for the Medical Servi_ce meets the 
criteria of Subsections 031.02.d. through 031.02.f. above, or where the Industrial Commission staff determines that 
its database is statistically unreliable, reasonableness of charges shall be determined based on all relevant evidence 
available. (7-1-95) 
032. BILLING AND PAYMENT REQUIREMENTS FOR MEDICAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURES 
PRELIMINARY TO DISPUTE RESOLUTION. 
01. Authority Aud Definitions. Pursuant to Section 72-508 and Section 72-803, Idaho Code, the 
Industrial Commission hereby promulgates this rule augmenting IDAPA 17.02.08.031 (formerly 17.01.03.803.A, 
which became effective June 1, 1992). The definitions set forth in ID APA 17 .02.08.031 are incorporated by reference 
as if fully set forth herein. (1-1-93) 
02. Time Periods. None of the pedods herein shall begin to run before the Notice of Injury/Claim for 
Benefits has been filed with the Employer as required by law. ( l- l-93) 
03. Provider To Furnish Information. A Provider, when submitting a bill to a Payor, shall inform the 
Payor of the nature and extent of Medical Services furnished and for which the bill is submitted. This information 
shall include, but is not limited to, the patient's name, the employer's name, the date the Medical Service was 
provided, the diagnosis, if any, and the amount of the charge or charges. (1-1-93) 
a. CPT and !CD Coding. A Provider's bill shall, whenever possible, describe the Medical Service 
provided, using the American Medical Association's appropriate Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) coding, 
including modifiers, for the year in which the service was performed and using current International Classification of 
Diseases (!CD) diagnostic coding, as well. (7-1-95) 
b. Contact Person. The bill shall also contain the name, address and telephone number of the 
individual the Payor may contact in the event the Payor seeks additional information regarding the Provider's bill. 
(1-1-93) 
c. Report to Accompany Bill. If required by the Payor, the bill shall be accompanied by a written 
report as defined by IDAPA 17.02.04.322.01.f. Where a bill is not accompanied by such Report, the periods expressed 
in Subsections 032.04 and 032.06, below, shall not begin to run until the Payor receives the Report. (7-1-95) 
04. Prompt Payment. If the Payor acknowledges liability for the claim and does not send a 
Preliminary Objection to, or Request for Clarification of, any charge, as provided in Subsection 032.06, below, the 
Payor shall pay the charge within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of the bill. The Commission will strictly apply 
all time limits and deadlines established by this rnle. However, a reasonable good faith effort to comply with the other 
provisions of this rule will generally be sufficient to protect a party's rights hereunder. (l-1-93) 
05. Partial Payment. If the Payor acknowledges liability for the claim and, pursuant to Subsection 
032.06 below, sends a Preliminary Objection, a Request for Clarification, or both, as to only part of a Provider's bill, 
the Payor must pay the charge or charges, or portion thereof, as to which no Preliminary Objection and/or Request for 
Clarification has been made, within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of the bill. The Commission will strictly apply 
all time limits and deadlines established by this rule. However, a reasonable good faith effort to comply with the other 
provisions of this rule will generally be sufficient to protect a party's rights hereunder. (7-1-95) 
06. Preliminary Objections And Requests For Clarification. (1-1-93) 
a. Preliminary Objection. Whenever a Payor objects to all or any part of a Provider's bill on the 
ground that such bill contains a charge or charges that do not comport with the applicable administrative rule, the 
Payor shall send a written Preliminary Objection to the Provider within thirty (30) calendar days of the Payor's receipt 
of the bill explaining the basis for each of the Payor's objections. (l-1-93) 
b. Request for Clarification. Where the Payor requires additional information, the Payor shall send a 
written Request for Clarification to the Provider within thirty (30) calendar days of the Payor's receipt of the bill, and 
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(l-1-93) 
c. Provider Contact. Each Preliminary Objection and Request for Clarification shall contain the name, 
address and phone number of the individual the Provider may contact regarding the Preliminary Objection or Request 
for Clarification. ( 1-1-93) 
d. Failure of Payor to Object or Request. Where a Payor does not send a Preliminary Objection to a 
charge set for!h in a bill and/or a Request for Clarification within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of the bill, it 
shall be precluded from objecting to such charge as failing to comport with the applicable administrative rule. 
(1-1-93) 
07. Provider Reply To Preliminary Objection And/Or Request For Clarifirntion. (1-1-93) 
a. Where a Payor has timely sent a Preliminary Objection, Request for Clarification, or both, the 
Provider shall send to the Payor a written Reply, if any it has, wi1hin thirty (30) calendar days of the Provider's receipt 
of each Preliminary Objection and/or Request for Clarification. (1-1-93) 
b. Failure of Provider to Reply to Preliminary Objection. If a Provider fails to timely reply to a 
Preliminary Objection, 1he Provider shall be deemed to have acquiesced in the Payor's objection. (1-1-93) 
c. Failure of Provider to Reply to Request for Clarification. If a Provider fails to timely reply to a 
Request for Clarification, the period in which the Payor shall pay or issue a Final Objection shall not begin to run 
until such clarification is received. {1-1-93) 
08. Payor Shall Pay Or Issue Final Qbjection. The Payor shall pay 1he Provider's bill in whole or in 
part and/or shall send to the Provider a written Final Objection, if any it has, to all or part of the bill wi1hin thirty (30) 
calendar days of the Payor's receipt of the Reply. (1-1-93) 
09. .Failure Of Payor To Finally Object. Where the Payor does not timely send a Final Objection to 
any charge or portion thereof to which it continues to have an objection, it shall be precluded from further objecting to 
such charge as unacceptable. (1-1-93) 
10. Investigation Of Claim Compensability. Where a Payor is investigating 1he compensability of a 
claim as to which a Provider has submitted a bill, the Payor must send a Notice of Investigation of Claim 
Compensability to the Provider and 1he Patient within fifteen (1.5) calendar days of receipt of 1he Provider's bill. The 
Payor shall complete its investigation of claim compensability and notify the Commission, the Provider and the 
Patient of its determination wi1hin 1hirty (30) calendar days of the date the Notice of Investigation of Claim 
Compensability is sent. Where a Payor does not timely notify the Commission, the Provider and the Patient of its 
determination, the Payor shall be precluded from objecting to such charge as failing to comport with the applicable 
administrative rule. (1-1-93) 
a. Single Objection Sufficient. A single objection stating 1hat liability has been denied shall be 
sufficient for each Provider from whom a bill is received. (1-1-93) 
b. Effect of Commission Determination of Claim Compensability. The 1hirty (30) day period in which 
the Payor must pay the bill or send a Preliminary Objection and/or Request for Clarification shall recommence 
running on 1he date of entry of a final Commission order determining 1hat the claim is compensable. (l-l-93) 
c. Effect of Determination of Compensability. If the Payor, absent a Commission determination of 
claim compensability, concludes that it is liable for a claim, 1he thirty (30) day period in which 1he Payor must pay the 
bill or send a Preliminary Objection and/or Request for Clarification shall begin running on the date the Payor notifies 
1he Commission, Provider and Patient 1hat it accepts liability for the claim. (1-1-93) 
11, Dispute Resolution Process. If, after completing the applicable steps set for1h above, a Payor and 
Provider are unable to agree on the appropriate charge for any Medical Service, a Provider which has complied with 
1he applicable requirements of this rule may move the Commission to resolve the dispute as provided in 1he Judicial 
Rule Re: Disputes Between Providers and Payors as Referenced in IDAPA 17.02.08.03 l and 032 (formerly 
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17.01.03.803.a. and 803.b.). (l-l-93) 
12. Requirements Regarding Disputes Arisiug Before The Effective Date Of This Rule. (1-1-93) 
a. Written Demand Required. If, prior to January 1, 1993, a Payor notifies or has notified a Provider 
that it does not intend to fully pay any charge for Medical Services incurred prior to January 1, 1993, the Provider 
seeking payment for such charge must send a written Demand for Payment to the Payor no later than January 31, 
1993. (Note: Should the matter ultimately proceed to the dispute resolution phase set forth in the Judicial Rule, the 
Commission will resolve the dispute by applying the administrative rule which was in effect at the time the charge 
was incurred. Hence, if the charge in dispute was incurred prior to June I, 1992, the Commission will use this dispute 
resolution process to determine whether the Provider's charge is acceptable pursuant to the provisions of IDAPA 
17.01.03.803, then in effect. However, if the charge in dispute was incurred on or after June I, 1992, the Commission 
will use this dispute resolution process to determine whether the Provider's charge is acceptable pursuant to the 
provisions ofIDAPA 17.02.08.031, now in effect.) (l-1-93) 
b. All Provisions of this Rule Will Apply. Such a Demand shall substitute for the bill and Report 
referenced in Subsection 032.03 above, and must contain all the information required by that section. Service of a 
timely Demand for Payment will bring the other provisions of this rule into operation. (1-1-93) 
c. Failure of Provider to Make Written Demand. Providers failing to make a written Demand for 
Payment within thirty (30) calendar days of the effective date of this rule shall be forever barred from invoking the 
Dispute Resolution Process set forth in the applicable Judicial Rule. Demands and/or billings submitted previously 
either to the Payor or to the Commission will not suffice. (1-1-93) 
033. RULE GOVERNING APPROVAL OF ATTORNEY FEES IN WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
CASES. 
01. Authority Aud Definitions. Pursuant to Sections 72-404, 72-508, 72-707. 72-735 and 72-803, 
Idaho Code, the Commission promulgates this rule to govern the approval of attorney fees. (7-1-94) 
a. "Available funds" means a sum of money to which a charging lien may attach. It shall not include 
any compensation paid or not disputed to be owed prior to claimant's agreement to retain the attorney. (7-1-94) 
b. "Approval by Commission" means the Commission has approved the attorney fees in conjunction 
with an award of compensation or a lump sum settlement or otherwise in accordance with this rule upon a proper 
showing by the attorney seeking to have the fees approved. (7-1-94) 
c. "Charging lien" means a lien, against a claimant's right to any compensation under the Workers' 
Compensation Jaws, which may be asserted by an attorney who is able to demonstrate that: (7-1-94) 
i. There are compensation benefits available for distribution on equitable principles; (7-1-94) 
ii. The services of the attorney operated primarily or substantially to secure the fund out of which the 
attorney seeks to be paid; (7-1-94) 
client; 
iii. It was agreed that counsel anticipated payment from compensation funds rather than from the 
(7-1-94) 
iv. The claim is limited to costs, fees, or other disbursements incurred in the case through which the 
fund was raised; and (7-1-94) 
lien. 
V. There are equitable considerations that necessitate the recognition and application of the charging 
(7-1-94) 
d. "Fee agreement" means a written document evidencing an agreement between a claimant and 
counsel, in conformity with Rule 1.5, Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct (IRPC). (7-1-94) 
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IDAPA 17 
TITLE02 
CHAPTER OS 
17.02.08 - MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
000. LEGAL AUTHORITY. 
These rules are adopted and promulgated by the Industrial Commission pursuant to the provision of Section 72-508, 
Idaho Code. (7-6-94) 
001. TITLE AND SCOPE. 
These rules shall be cited as !DAPA 17.02.08, "Miscellaneous Provisions." 
002. WRITTEN INTERPRETATIONS. 
No written interpretations of these rules exist. 
(7-6-94) 
(7-6-94) 
003. ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS. 
There is no administrative appeal from decisions of the Industrial Commission in work~rs' compensation matters, as 
the Commission is exempted from contested-cases provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act. (7-6-94) 
004. INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE. 
No documents have been incorporated by reference into these rules. (3-12-07) 
005. OFFICE -- OFFICE HOURS -- MAILING ADDRESS AND STREET ADDRESS. 
This office is open from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., except Saturday, Sunday, and legal holidays. The department's 
mailing address is: P.O. Box 83720, Boise, ID 83720-0041. The principal place of business is 317 Main Street, 2nd 
Floor, Boise, ID 83702-7274. (3-12-07) 
006. PUBLIC RECORDS ACT COMPLIANCE. 
Any records associated with these rules are subject to the provisions of the Idaho Public Records Act Title 9, Chapter 
3, and Title 41, Idaho Code. (3-12-07) 
007. -- 030. (RESERVED). 
031. ACCEPTABLE CHARGES FOR MEDICAL SERVICES UNDER THE IDAHO WORKERS' 
COMPENSATION LAW. 
Pursuant to Section 72-508 and Section 72-803, Idaho Code, the Industrial Commission (hereinafter "the 
Commission") hereby adopts the following rule for determining acceptable charges for medical services provided 
under the Idaho Workers' Compensation Law: (3-12-07) 
01. Defmltions. Words and terms tlsed in this rule are defined in the subsections which follow. 
(6-1-92) 
a. "Acceptable charge" means the lower of the charge for medical services calcnlated in accordance 
with this rule or as billed by the provider, or the charge agreed to pursuant to written contract. (3· 12-07) 
b. 
basis only. 
"Ambulatory Surgery Center (ASC)" means a facility providing surgical services on an outpatient 
(4-2-08) 
c. "Hospital" is any acute care facility providing medical or hospital services and which bills using a 
Medicare universal hospital billing form. (4-2-08) 
i. 
ii. 
Large hospital is any hospital with more than one hundred (100) acute care beds. 
Small Hospital is any hospital with one hundred ( 100) acute care beds or less. 
(4-2-08) 
(4-2-08) 
d. "Provider'' means any person, finn, corporation, partnership, association, agency, institution or 
other legal entity providing any kind of medical service related to the treatment of an industrially injured patient 
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which are compensable under Idaho's Workers' Compensation Law. (3-12-07) 
e. "Payor" means the legal entity responsible for paying medical benefits under Idaho's Workers' 
Compensation Law. (6-1-92) 
f. "Medical Service~ means medical, surgical~ dental or other attendance or treatment, nurse and 
hospital service, medicine, apparatus, appliance, prostheses, and related service, facility, equipment and supply. 
(3-12-07) 
g. "Reasonable," means a charge docs not exceed the Provider's "usual" charge and does not exceed 
the "customary" charge, as defined below. (3-12-07) 
h, "Usual" means the most frequent charge made by an individual Provider for a given medical 
service to non-industrially injured patients. (3-12-07) 
i, "Customary" means a charge which shall have an upper limit no higher than the 90th percentile, as 
determined by the Commission, of usual charges made by Idaho Providers for a given medical service. (3-12-07) 
02. Acceptable Charge. Payors shall pay providers the acceptable charge for medical services. 
(3-12-07) 
a. Adoption of Standard. The Commission hereby adopts the Resource-Based Relative ½Jue Scale 
(RBRVS), published by the Cenrers for Medicare and Medicaid Services of the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services, as amended, as the standard to be used for determining the acceptable charge for medical services 
provided under the Idaho Workers' Compensation Law by providers other than hospitals and ASCs. The standard for 
determining the acceptable charge for hospitals and ASCs shall be: (4-2-08) 
L 
ii. 
For large hospitals: Eighty-five percent (85%}ofthe appropriate inpatient charge. 
For small hospitals: Ninety percent (90%) of the appropriate inpatient charge. 
(4-2-08) 
(4-2008) 
m. For ambulatory surgery centers (ASCs) and hospital outpatient charges: Eighty percent (80%) of 
the appropriate charge. (4-2-08) 
iv. 
(50%). 
Surgically implanted hardware shall be reimbursed at the rate of actual cost plus fifty percent 
. (4-2-08) 
v. Paragraph 03 l.02.e., shall not apply to hospitals or ASCs. The Collllllission shall determine the 
appropriate charge for hospital and ASC services that are disputed based on all relevant evidence in accordance with 
the procedures set out in Subsection 032.10. (4-2-08) 
b. Conversion Factors. The following conversion factors shall be applied to the fully-implemented 
fucility or non-facility Relative Value Unit (RVU) as determined by place of service found in the latest RBRVS, as 
amended, that was published before December 31 of the previous calendar year for a medical service identified by a 
code assigned to that service in the latest edition of the Physicians' Current Procedural Terminology (CPI), published 
by the American Medical Association, as amended: 
DESCRli'TION 
Anesthesia 00000 - 09999 Anesthesia 
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SERVICE CODE RANGE(S) CATEGORY 
22000 - 22999 
23000 - 24999 
25000 - 27299 
Surgery- 27300 - 27999 
Group One 29800 - 29999 
61000 - 61999 
62000 - 62259 
63000 • 63999 
Surgery- 28000 - 28999 
Group Two 64550 • 64999 
Surgery- 13000 - 19999 
Group Three 20050 - 21999 
. 
20000 - 20615 
30000 - 39999 
40000 - 49999 
Surgery- 50000 - 59999 
Group Four 60000 - 60999 
62260 - 62999 
64000 - 64549 
65000 - 69999 
Surgery- 10000 - 12999 
Group Five 29000-29799 
Radiology 70000 • 79999 
Pathology& 80000 • 89999 Laboratory 
90000 • 90799 
Medicine· 94000 • 94999 
Group One 97000 - 97799 
97800 • 98999 
Medicine - 90800 • 92999 
Group Two 96040 • 96999 99000 - 99607 
Medicine - 93000 - 93999 
Group Three 95000 • 96020 
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MEDICAL FEE SCHEDULE 
DESCRIPTION CONVERSION FACTOR 
. 
Spine 
Shoulder, Upper Arm, & Elbow 
Forearm, Wrist, Hand, Pelvis & Hip 
Leg, Knee, & Ankle $140 Endoscopy &Arthroscopy 
Skull, Meninges & Brain 
Repair, Neuroendoscopy & Shunts 
Spine & Spinal Cord 
Foot& Toes $125 Nerves & Nervous System 
lntegumentary System $110 Musculosl<eletal System 
Musculosl<eletal System 
Respiratory & Cardiovascular 
Digestive System 
Urinary System $85 Endocrine System 
Spine & Spinal Cord 
Nerves & Nervous System 
Eye& Ear 
lntegumentary System $67 Casts & Strapping 
RadiolOIJY $85 
Pathology & Laboratory To Be Determined 
Immunization, Injections, & Infusions 
Pulmonary / Pulse Oximetry $45 Physical Medicine & Rehabilitation 
Acupuncture, Osteopathy, & Chiropractic 
Psychiatry & Medicine 
Assessments & Special Procedures $64.50 
E / M &. Miscellaneous Services 
Cardiography, Cathetertzation, & Vascular studies $70 Allergy / Neuromuscular Procedures 
(4-2-08) 
c. The Conversion Factor for the Anesthesiology Cl'f Codes shall be multiplied by the Anesthesia 
Base Units assigned to that Cl'f Code by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services of the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services as of December 31 of the previous calendar year, plus the allowable time units reported 
for the procedure. Time units are computed by dividing reported time by fifteen (15) minutes. Time units will not be 
used for Cl'f Code 01996. · (4-2-08) 
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d. Adjustment of Conversion Factors. The conversion factors set out in this rule shall be adjusted each 
fiscal year (FY), starting with FY 2009, as determined by the director of the Department of Health and Welfare using 
the methodology set forth in section 56-136, Idaho Code, pursuant to Section 72-803, Idaho Code. (4-2-08) 
e. Services Without CPT Code, RVU or Conversion Factor. The acceptable charge for medical 
services that do not have a current CPT code, a currently assigned RVU, or a conversion factor will be the reasonable 
charge for that service, based upon the usual and customary charge and other relevant evidence, as determined by the 
Commission. Where a service with a CPr Code, RYU, and conversion factor is, nonetheless, claimed to be 
exceptional or unusual, the Commission may, notwithstanding the conversion factor for that servke set out jn 
Subsection 031.02.b., determine the acceptable charge for that service, based on all relevant evidence in accordance 
with the procedures set out in Subsection 032.10. (4-2-08) 
f. Coding. The Commission will generally follow the coding guidelines published by the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services and by the American Medical Association, including the use of modifiers. The 
procedure with the largest RVU will be the primary procedure and will be listed first on the claim form. Modifiers 
will be reimbursed as follows: (3-12-07) 
i. Modifier 50: Additional fifty percent (50%) for bilateral procedure. (3-12-07) 
iL Modifier 51: Fifty percent (50%) of secondary procedure. This modifier will be applied to each 
medical or surgical procedure rendered during the same session as the primary procedure. (3-12-07) 
iii. 
iv. 
assistants. 
Modifier 80: Twenty-five percent (25%) of coded procedure. (3-12-07) 
Modifier 81: Fifteen percent (15%) of coded procedure. This modifier applies to MD and non-MD 
(3-12-07) 
032. BILLING AND PAYMENT REQUIREMENTS FOR MEDICAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURES 
PRELIMINARY TO DISPUTE RESOLUTION. 
01. Authority and Definitions. Pursuant to Section 72-508 and Section 72-803, Idaho Code, the 
Industrial Commission hereby promulgates this rule augmenting IDAPA 17.02.08.031. The definitions set forth in 
ID APA 17.02.08.031 are incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein. (3-12-07) 
02. Time Periods. None of the periods herein shall begin to run before the Notice oflnjury/Claim for 
Benefits has been filed with the Employer as required by law. (I-1-93) 
03. Provider to Furnish Information. A Provider, when submitting a bill to a Payor, shall inform the 
Payor of the nature and extent of medical services furnished and for which the bill is submitted. This information 
shall include, but is not limited to, the patient's name, the employer's name, the date the medical service was 
provided, the diagnosis, if any, and the amount of the charge or charges. Failure to submit a bill complying with 
Subsection 032.03 to the Payor within one hw,dred twenty (120) days of the date of service will result in the 
ineligibility of the Provider to utilize the dispute resolution procedures of the Commission set out in Subsection 
032.10 for that service. (3-12-07) 
a. CPT and !CD Coding. A Provider's bill shall, whenever possible, describe the Medical Service 
provided, using the American Medical Association's appropriate Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) coding, 
including modifiers, for the year in which the service was performed and nsing current International Classification of 
Diseases (!CD) diagnostic coding, as well. (7-1-95) 
b. Contact Person. The bill shall also contain the name, address and telephone number of the 
individual the Payor may contact in the event the Payor seeks additional information regarding the Provider's bill. 
(1-1-93) 
c. Report to Accompany Bill. If requested by the Payor, the bill shall be accompanied by a written 
report as defined by IDAPA 17.02.04.322.01.f. Where a bill is not accompanied by such Report, the periods 
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expressed in Subsections 032.04 and 032.06, below, shall not begin to run until the Payor receives the Report. 
(3-12-07) 
04. Prompt Payment. Unless the Payor denies liability for the claim or, pursuant to Subsection 
032.06, sends a Preliminary Objection Request for Clarification, or both, as to any charge, the Payor shall pay the 
charge within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of the bill. (3-12-07) 
05. Partial Payment. If the Payor acknowledges liability for the claim and, pursuant to Subsection 
032.06 below, sends a Preliminary Objection, a Request for Clarification, or both, as to only part of a Provider's bill, 
the Payor must pay the charge or charges, or portion thereof, as to which no Preliminary Objection and/or Request for 
Clarification has been made, within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of the bill. (;l, 12-07) 
06. Preliminary Objections and Requests for Clarification. (1-1-93) 
a. Preliminary Objection. Whenever a Payor objects to all or any part of a Provider's bill on the 
ground that such bill contains a charge or charges that do not comport with the applicable administrative rule, the 
Payor shall send a written Preliminary Objection to the Provider within thirty (30) calendar days of the Payor's 
receipt of the bill explaining the basis for each of the Payor's objections. (1-1-93) 
b. Request for Clarification. Where the Payor requires additional information, the Payor shall send a 
written Request for Clarification to the Provider within thirty (30) calendar days of the Payor's receipt of the bill, and 
shall specifically describe the information sought. (1-1-93) 
c. Provider Contact. Each Preliminary Objection and Request for Clarification shall contain the name, 
address and phone number of the individual located within the state ofldaho that the Provider may contact regarding 
the Preliminary Objection or Request for Clarification. (3-12-07) 
d, Failure of Payor to Object or Request or Provide Contact:. Where a Payor does not send a 
Preliminary Objection to a charge set forth in a bill and/or a Request for Clarification within thirty (30) calendar days 
of receipt of the bill, or provide an in-state contact in accord with Subsection 032.06.c., it shall be precluded from 
objecting to such charge as failing to comport with the applicable administrative rule. (3-12-07) 
07. Provider Reply to Preliminary Objection and/or Request for Clarification. (1-1-93) 
a. Where a Payor has timely sent a Preliminary Objection, Request for Clarification, or both, the 
Provider shall send to the Payor a written Reply, if any it has, within thirty (30) calendar days of the Provider's receipt 
of each Preliminary Objection and/or Request for Clarification. (1 • 1-93) 
b, Failure of Provider to Reply to Preliminary Objection. If a Provider .fails to timely .reply to a 
Preliminary Objection, the Provider shall be deemed to have acquiesced in the Payor's objection. (l-l-93) 
c. . Failure of Provider to Reply to Request for Clarification. If a Provider rails to timely reply to a 
Request for Clarification, the period in which the Payor shall pay or issue a Final Objection shall not begin to run 
until such clarification is received. . (1-1-93) 
08, Payor Shall Pay or Issue Final Objection. The Payor shall pay the Provider's bill in whole or in 
part and/or shall send to the Provider a written Final Objection, if any it has, to all or part of the bill within thirty (30) 
calendar days of the Payor's receipt of the Reply. (1-1-93) 
09, Failure of Payor to Finally Object. Where the Payor does not timely send a Final Oijection to 
any charge or portion thereof to which it continues to have an objection, it shall be precluded from further objecting 
to such charge as unacceptable. (1-1-93) 
10. Dispute Resolution Process. If, after completing the applicable steps set forth above, a Payor and 
Provider are unable to agree on tbe appropriate charge for any Medical Service, a Provider which has complied with 
the applicable requirements of this rule may move the Commission to resolve the dispute as provided in the Judicial 
Rule Re: Disputes Between Providers and Payors as Referenced in Sections 031 and 032 of this rule. If Provider's 
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motion disputing CPT coded items prevails, Payor shall pay the amount found by the Commission to be owed, plus 
an additional thirty percent (30%) of that amount to compensate Provider for costs and expenses associated with 
using the dispute resolution process. For motions filed by a hospital or ambulatory surgical center1 under section 
031.02.a.v., or by a provider under 031.02.e, the additional thirty percent (30%) shall be due only if the Payor does 
not pay the amount found due within thirty (30) days of the administrative order. (3-12-07) 
033. RULE GOVERNING APPROVAL OF ATTORNEY FEES IN WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
CASES. 
01. Authority and Defmitions. Pursuant to Sections 72-404, 72-508, 72-707, 72-735 and 72-803, 
Idaho Code, the Commission promulgates this rule to govern the approval ofattorney fees. {7-1-94) 
a. "Available funds" means a sum of money to which a charging lien may attach. It shall not include 
any compensation paid ornot disputed to be owed prior to claimant's agreement to retain the attorney. (7-1-94) 
b. uApproval by Commission" means the Commlssion has approved the attorney fees in conjunction 
with an award of compensation or a lump sum settlement or otherwise in accordance with this rule upon a proper 
showing by the attorney seeking to have the fees approved. (7-1-94) 
c. ~'Charging lien" means a lien, against a claimant's right to any compensation under the Workers' 
Compensation Jaws, which may be asserted by an attomey who is able to demonstrate that: · (7-1-94) 
i. There are compensation benefits available for distribution on equitable principles; (7-1-94) 
ii. The services of the attorney operated primarily or substantially to secure the fund out of which the 
attorney seeks to be paid; (7-1-94) 
client; 
iii. It was agreed that counsel anticipated payment from compensation funds rather than from the 
{7-1-94) 
iv. The claim is limited to costs, fees, or other disbursements incurred in the case through which the 
fund was raised; and {7 • 1-94) 
lien. 
v. There are equitable considerations that necessitate the recognition and application of the charging 
(7-1-94) 
d. "Fee agreement" means a written document evidencing an agreement between a claimant and 
counsel, in conformity with Rule 1.5, Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct {IRPC). (7-1-94) 
e. "Reasonable" means that an attorney's fees are consistent with the fee agreement and are to be 
satisfied from available funds, subject to the element of reasonableness contained in IRPC 1.5. (7-1-94) 
i. In a case in which no hearing on the merits has been held, twenty-five percent {25%) of available 
funds shall be presumed reasonable; or (7-1-94) 
ii. In a case in which a hearing has been heid and briefs submitted (or waived) under Judicial Rules of 
Practice and Procedure (JRP), Rules X and XI, thirty percent (30%) of available funds shall be presumed reasonable; 
~ ~~ 
iii. In any case in which compensation is paid for total permanent disability, fifteen percent (15%) of 
such disability compensation after ten (l 0) years from dale such total permanent disability payments commenced. 
(7-1-94) 
02. Statement of Charging Lien. {7-1-94) 
a. All requests for approval of fees shall be deemed requests for approval of a cha,ging lien. (7-1-94) 
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Bill# H 578 
February 13, 2006 
1:30p.m. 
Room416 
Chairman Schaefer, Vice Chairman McKague, Representatives Lake, 
Trail, Bradford, Garrett, Bolz, Skippen, Anderson, Kemp, Mathews, Ringo, 
Shepherd (2), Pasley-Stuart 
Representative Crow 
See Attachment 1 
Rep. Lake moved to accept the minutes of January 23, The motion 
passed by voice vote. 
Rep. Lake moved to accept the minutes of·January 25. The motion 
passed by voice vote. 
Bob Fick, Communications Manager, Department of Commerce and 
Labor (DCL), opened the hearing on H 578. He distributed a handout on 
the Special Administration Fund Annual Report. He said this fund is a 17 
percent diversion for 2006 only. Removing the 49 percent trigger allows 
17 percent of every Ul dollar to flow into the State Reserve Fund held in 
the Idaho State Treasury until the balance exceeds one percent of taxable 
wages. He discussed the two accounts: the Federal Reserve held Trust 
Funds; and the State's Reserve Fund. He said the principal amounts 
targeted in this legislation are the $116 million in the Federal Reserve 
Fund, and $85 million in the State's Reserve Fund. Mr. Fick said after 
2006, the17 percent will return to the Employers' Contribution Fund, and 
placed in the State Reserve Fund, 80 percent will go to the Federal Trust 
Fund, and 3 percent will remain in the Workforce Training Program. He 
said this diversion doesn't change the dollar amount employers pay into 
the fund nor does it affect employee benefits. In 2005, over 46,000 
employers in the state of Idaho paid $130 million into the State's Reserve 
Fund. He added that Idaho was the 11th highest in the nation in UI dollars 
paid out last year. He talked about the 62 percent reduction of federal 
funds in the last five years. He said that the federal government has 
based their budget on national data. With the lack of federal funds the 
Department may have to go to call centers, but stated they are trying to 
keep a local presence in the communities, and not close the workforce 
centers in Idaho. See Attachment 2 
Teresa Molitor, representing Idaho Association of Commerce and 
Industry (IACI), informed the Committee that IACI supports this blll. She 
commented that she didn't know what the Public Affairs Committee will 
do. 
Pam Eaton, President of Idaho Retailer's Association, stated they 
Questions from 
Committee 
Members: 
MOTION: 
Bill# H 648 
Questions from 
Committee 
Members: 
support this bill now that it is split from H 407. 
Rep. Lake asked when the $25 million is returned to the account at the 
end of this year, will it continue to earn $1 million in interest every year 
after this. Mr. Fick replied yes. Rep. Lake asked when will the one 
percent trigger the diversion again. Mr. Fick responded never. This is a 
one time only situation, and it cannot be triggered again. 
Rep. Lake moved to send H 578 to the House Floor with a do pass 
recommendation. The motion passed by voice vote. 
Brad Jaynes, representing Industrial Commission, distributed written 
testimony. HEl explains that Idaho's Worker's Compensation law was 
enacted in 1917 to provide injured workers an(! their families with 
compensation without the need to file a lawsuit or prove that their 
employers's negligence caused the injury or death. One of the 
amendments "not for pecuniary gain" came from the original 1917 law. 
He states that Idaho is the only state that still retains this exemption. The 
Idaho Supreme Court has determined that "not for pecuniary gain" had 
nothing to do with not-for-profit, and said it has nothing to do with money. 
He said this law could result in many employers that were required to 
carry worker's compensation to claim exemption, because they do not 
receive "equivalent" payment for their services provided by their 
employees. This will ensure that Idaho workers regardless of the profit or 
non-profit status of their employers will continue to be protected by 
Idaho's worker's compensation law. See Attachment 3 
Teresa Molitor, representing IACI, informed the committee they oppose 
this bill for two reasons: 1) section 1, subsection 4, the definition for 
''employment" changed. She stated that it is perilous to tamper with the 
definition in the worker's compensation law, it can invite litigation; and 2) 
the word "normally" is not a good definition for a business carried on by an 
employer. 
Rep. Mathews commented that the ruling came down from a Supreme 
Court case. Ms. Molitor responded that the bill is problematic with the 
way it is drafted. 
Rep. Pasley-Stuart asked Ms. Molitor if she had worked on the velbiage 
with the Industrial Commission. Ms. Molitor replied no. 
John Barrett, Attorney, addressed Rep. Pasley-Stuart's comment, 
stating he sat in on the Industrial Commission Advisory Committee from 
the last session, and informed the Committee that Mr. Jaynes had advised 
them to withdraw this legislation from the last IE!Qislature due to Judge 
Larson broadening the language by inserting the words "business" and 
"normally" to strengthen the intent of the language. He said the language 
change is based on legal research, and the proposed language is valid, 
and does what it's intended to do. He said that other states made this 
change back in the 1970s, and Idaho is the last state to do this. He 
added that the Advisory Committee will be glad to get rid of the old law. 
Max Sheils, Attorney, Ellis, Brown & Sheils, informed the Committee 
that he was part of the Advisory Committee for worker's compensation. 
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Bill# H649 
Motion: 
He said at that time the IACI people supported this bill. He feels that the 
bill is tightened with this language. 
Rep. Garrett made the motion to send Bill # H 648 to the House Floor 
with a do pass recommendation. The motion passed by voice vote. 
Rep. Garrett opened the hearing on Bill # H 649. She said this bill 
defines balance billing under the Worker's Compensation statute, and 
clarifies that balance billing is not permitted. She informed the Committee 
that balance billing occurs when a medical provider continues to bill an 
injured worker, and insists on payment from the injured worker. She said 
this is inconsistent with the Idaho Worker's Compensation !..aw. The 
injured worker is not responsible for charges from medical providers when 
it is a worker's compensation claim. She asked the Committee if she 
could yield to Max Sheils, Attorney from Ellis, Brown & Sheils. 
Max Sheils explained to the Committee what balance billing is .. He said 
this law will enforce and convince providers that balance billing is not 
allowed by statute. Mr. Shells talked about participating with the 
Worker's Compensation subcommittee who worked with insurance 
companies and medical providers to arrive at this language. He informed 
the Committee that the state of Oregon provides a punitive fine of $1000 
to providers for each balance billing sent to a worker's comp patient. He 
stated that Oregon has not had to use this, and the Industrial Commission 
Advisory Committee felt that Idaho didn't need this penalty, 
Rep. Anderson asked Mr. Sheils if Oregon didn't use the penalty 
because it is so onerous. Mr. Sheils replied no. He said that the Idaho 
Industry Commission wanted to try this without inserting a penalty 
provision. 
Teresa Molitor distributed a handout from IACI on balance billing. (See 
Attachment 4). She said that IACI Human Resources Committee voted 
to support Bill # H649. She states that IACI has some concerns with the 
lack of penalty for offenders. She discussed a letter from Jon Bauman, 
Attorney with Elam & Burke, dated November 17, 2005, written to Max 
Sheils. The letter applauds Mr. Sheils for clarifying a problem that has 
been going on for years, which is: balance billing is not permissible. See 
Attachments 5 
Lyn Darrington, representing Employers Insurance Group (EIG), 
informed the Committee that a Worker's Compensation group in Nevada 
supports this law, but would prefer a penalty. 
Dave Whaley, representing AFL-CIO, stated it is their consensus this is 
a good bill, and the AFL-CIO supports it. 
John Barrett, Attorney, discussed the current statute not defining 
balance billing. He talked about the new language that states "no 
provider shall engage in balance billing". He said that Idaho has one of 
the more sophisticated systems. He commented "with Idaho's 
environment, this bill will work". 
Rep. Bradford made the motion to send Bill # H 649 to the House 
HOUSE COMMERCE AND HUMAN RESOURCES 
February 13, 2006 - Minutes - Page 3 
ADJOURN: 
Floor with a do pass recommendation. The motion carried by voice 
vote. 
Chairman Schaefer thanked Mr. Barrett and Mr. Sheils for their hard 
work in bringing this legislation together. He said this is a good bill for 
business and labor. 
2:40 p.m. 
Representative Robert Schaefer 
Chairman 
Cj Johnson 
Secretary 
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